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One or the most prominent characteristics of the
modern business world is',,the fierce competition which
exists in all branches of trade. If the old maxim which
has been so often quoted, that competition is t:,ie life
of trade, were strictly true and applied with full force
to the present situation, it m]ight be reasonable to sup-
pose that those business enterprises which are now sub-
ject to the sharpest rivalry would enjoy the greatest
prosperity. But judging from the complaints which are
uttered concerning the evils of unrestricted competition,
and the efforts which are made to avoid its effects, it
seems safe to assert that the contrary is the result,
and that there may be too much of this life giving ele-
mant. The tendency of late seems to have been towards
an unlimited expansion in all lilies of business. Fac-
tories and shops have been built, and goods have bean
produced by them, with little apparent regard to the de-
mand which must regulate the price for which they will
be sold. These goods, once map.e, must be disposed of in
order that the money used in their proatction may be
2re-employed in paying running expenses and indebtedness.
As a result prices would be measurea not by the value
of the goods, but by the necessities of the owners.
Few concerns could afford to carry their stock until
paying prices could be obtained, but would be compelled
to sell out for whatever sum could be gotten. As a re-
sult, the over production of the goods and the financial
weakness of their ownersforced down the prices of many
stable articles until they became so low that little or
no profits were to be earned by their manufacture.
Not only was this result brought about by the reckless
manner in which manufacturing establishments were in-
creased in number; but also by the increased facilities
for transportation and communication. ly these last,
localities situated at a distance would be brought into
direct competition; and establishments whose existence
would be utterly unknown to one another in one year
would be business rivals in the next. The result of
all this was a fierce straggle, not only for prof-
its, but in many cases for very existence. The contin-
ued existence of this condition of things naturally
caused those most ai"ectly affected to seek most dil-
igently for some remedy. This search seemed to con-
vince all that there was but one thing to be done, and
that was to reduce the number of competitors. Such a
purpose met witi the approval, not only of business men,
but of writers on ecnomic subjects, and even in sane
cases Of the courts. Two alternatives were offered in
accomplishing this object: Either-Ito engage in such a
fierce ,iar of competition as to drive to the wall all
weak concerns; or to use more peaceful means, and by
purchase remove a competitor from the field altoether,
or by consolidation make him an ally. The first alter-
native possessed too many dangers to be adopted except
as a last resort. The second was theone whichwas
adopted, and in some form or other put into effect.
This last alternative might be brought abo: . either by
removing competitors one at- a time by contracts with
each one, or by a combination which would include all
or a majority and render their interests identical.
The first course by which one competitor might be removed
through a contract in which he restrained himself from
competing, has been sanctioned by many decisions.
One of the first of these seems to be the case of
Lroad v. Jollyfe--Cro. Jac. 596--(1621) in which it
w,.s said: "F'1or a valuable consider ition, anu voluntari-
ly, one may ar-ree not to use his trade. " In the same
dir-ection was the decision in the famous case of "1itch-
ell v. Reynolds--1 P. Wins. 11;1-- deciaeci in 1711, and
which case, on account of the aiscussion of the law of
restr'Uint of trade which the judge incorporated into his
opinion, has been cited a vast number of times; and very
cften as authority for decisions differing very much
in their results from those ar'ived at in this p'>rticular
case. The tenor of more rece,-,t case2, both in England
and Amiei-ica, see_,s to be toward holding that the restric-
tion in such contracts must be reasonable, th at is afford
n, mcive protection to the party benefited, and impose no
greater rest,-aint upon the pa-ty restricted, than is
necessary to carr; out the purpese of the contract.
This rule* as t,, ttie reasonableness of the resti'aint has
changed and grown hroaaei anu broader, until nuw the
restriction from competition which a man may place upon
himself when he sells out his business to another is al-
most livnitless. :omie recent cases which discuss and ap-
ply this r' le as to reasonableness are; Leslie v. Lor-
5rillard--llO 1'2. Y. , 5l'-- Diamond ;atch Co. v. Roeber--
106 IN. Y. , 473-- Leal v. Chase--31 >ic2., 4bO-- Lorsont
v. Leather Co.--Law Rep. 15 Eq. Cases, 64.9-- 2ousillon
v. Rousillon--L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 351--. In the first of
these, a corporation runninr a line o) stearnships from
U'ew York to 1Lorfolk, Va. bought out a competinr line;
and a clause i, the contract restraining the owners of
the rival line from entering into any further competi-
tion, was upheld. In the seend, a contract made by
Roeber not to engare in the match business anywhere in
the United States except in Montana and T,,evada was sus-
tained. In the fourth, a restriction which embraced
all Europe was discussed and held Food; and in Rousillon
v. Rousillon, ani e,'ployee of the plaintff in co sider-
ation of his employment ar-reed not to enter into any com-
petition with the plaintiff for -2 certain period after
leaving him, aid the agr'eement was held good. A few
quotations frovL. these decisions may serve to shw the
attitude of the courts on the subject of competition.
Says Jure Gray in Leslie v. Lorrillard, "The tendency
of modern thought and of the decisions, owev i , has
been no longer to upholc. in its strictness the doctrine
which formerly prevailed in respect to agreements in
restraint of' trade. The severity 'wvith which such agrefe-
ments were "irst treated became more and more relaxed
by exceptions and qualifications. This changet-: was grad-
ual and may be considered, perhaps, as due mainly to the
rgrowth anu spread of the industrial activities of the
world, and to enlar!'ed cotmercial facilities, which ran-
der such agreements less dangerous as tending to create
monopolies." In the Diamond W,1atch Co. v. Roeber Judge
Andrews said; "it is quite obvious that some of the reas-
ons fo±' such a doctrine are much less forcible now than
when Llitchell v. Reynolds was decided. Steam and elec-
tricity have, for the purposes of trade and commerce,
almost annihilated distance,and the whole world is now
a mart for the distribution of the products of industry.
The great d.iffsion of wealth and the restless activity
of mankind striving to better their condition, has great-
ly enlarged the field of human enterprise and created a
vast number of new industries, which give scope to inge-
nuity and employment for capital and labor. The tenden-
ct of recent adjudica tions is marked in the direction of
relaxing the rif:or of the doctrine that all contracts in
general restraint of tra,.e are void i:'-'eziective of
c i r c,:1.- t ance s.
it was one of the r les fi.st established in con-
sidering cont,'acts in restraint of trade, that the'! were
to be lookeu upon as prima facie bad, but in Kousillon
v. ILousillon this i',le seems to have bern aisrega_,ed,
and within certain limits the buraen of showing that the
contract was invalid on the ground of restraint of trade
was thrown upon the doefnuant.
And in Leal v. Chase, Judge Christiancy, in speakin-r,
of the objections urged in _itchell v. Reynlas, viz.:
First. They tend to prevent competition jhich the pub-
lic interests favor; and
Second. They aeprive the state of the services of a
citizen by binding him to ialeness or emigration; says;
"As to the first ground, it may be said it is quite true
the public are interested in competion in business;
but this is not true unaor all circumstance nor t- every
extent. The pul-lic is quite as much inerested in the
propsi'erity of its citizens in their various avocations
as it can possibly be in their competition. The latter
may bring low prices to purchasers, but may also bring
8them so low that capital becomes unprofitable and busi-
ness men fail to the great injury of the comniunity. "
The doci-ion in itchell v. RUeynolus is then quoted from
to show that even at that tirie the evils of .inrestricted
competition were recognized, and that it may or may not
have been beneficial under different. circumstances.
Then the Judge says: "And it may well be asked,
who in general are the best judges of these circumstance*,
the parties concerned, who have an interest in making them
the subject of their contracts, or the courts, who can
obtain of the circumstances only such partial and unsat-
isfactory views as conflictin and imperfect evidence
can give ther. As to the second ground it must be con-
ceded that the state has always an interest that none
of its citizens shall be kept in enforced idleness.
But when a contract only binus a person not to engage
in a particular business within the state, is this con-
sequence a necessary oi, even a probable one? it might
have been so in Eng:land in the days of Chief Justice
Parker when a system of apprenticeship prevailed which
rendered it exceedingly difficult for one to obtain a
living by his industry in any other avocation than that
9foi- which he had fitted himself by serving his time un-
der its rules and under the law, but in this country
at this time -- where a change of occupation is too com-
mon to excite remark; where merc!iants become manufac-
turers, and lawyers farmers, and far'ers traders, not
because they receive a consideration for doing so, but
because with larger opportunities for observation than
they had at first, they have rally satisfied themselves
that such changes will be for their advantage, as oftimes
they have proven to be,--- any rule of law which should
assume that one who for a valuable consideration bar-
gains not to follow his previous business, had thereby
bound hiv-self to idleness and penury, wvotld be a rule
absurd in.itself, and contrary to general experience and
observation. " 1
These quotations show the drift of the recent de-
cisions in treatinF contracts whereby one person is re-
strained from competing with another. The tendency in
these cases seems to be towards almost complete freedom
in the making of such contracts, and the old rules that
treated them as prima facie the outcast and pariahs of
the contract world and rendered it exceedingly difficult
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for their Food character, if they had one, to be proven,
have almost become obsolete.
This tendency, as has been said in one of the quo-
tations, arises fror m the chang s and :.-oaifications in
busii-vess inethoas t!,lt have beeon constantly made, and
thlese changcs seei: to continually call for more liberty
in the making of contracts of this nature.
Lut while the courts were growing more lenient in
thei' ti'eatinent ,f tJse contracts, the situation was be-
coming such that some more expeditious and comprehensive
means of suppressing competition was necessary; and by
the time the rule as to contracts in restraint of trade
had been rel-:-xed to its greatest extent, those wishing
to attain this result had acopteu other means for the
purpose.
These different methods of doing away with competi-
tion,,first by individual restraint by contract, and
second the various methos ,f restraint b,. combination,
were not tried in the order named, but pr_ ctically at the
same time. ievertheless they seem to present distinct
steps tending in the same airection. The next step
taken .,as by combination. To the business man, anxious
to avoil the fierce rivalry which he must endure, the
prospect of making allies of his rivals; and working
wit them to attain successful results and sharing with
all the profits of the entire business, was very alluring,
This fact caused many of tiese combinations to spring
into being. The first and most simple attempts were in
the form of agreements between sevq)ral parties binding
th mselves to observe certain restrictions in conduct-
ing the business they carried on in comnion. These re-
strictions usually were intended to cotrol prices and the
amount of product.
.'any of these associations were formed, but it soon
appeared that they couL not withstand the attacks made
on them from without, nor survive internal dissensions.
Their own rmembers would break the rules laid down and if
any legal steps were taken to compel obedience to these
rules the courts would, so far fro; enforcing them,
hasten to brand the whole combination as illegal.
The fate of these associations, as well as some of
their objects and restrictions may be.illustrated by the
following cases.
One o.' those most often cited and also one of the
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earliest is hooker v. Vandewater--4 Denio, 34(j-- decided
in 1845. in this case an agreement between the owners
of five lines of boats doing business on the Erie Canal
was in question. E"' this apreement the:,Y entered into
a combination and prescribed one schedule of rates for
fi'eight and passenger;charges, and also provided that the
total proceeds of the business should be divided among
the various lines in certain proportions. Each of these
lines was to cary freight and passengers at the prices
fixed by the schedule, and to obey all the other restric-
tions made by the contract.
This agi'eement was held void and illegal under the
provisions of the Revised Statute which made it a misde-
meanor for two more persons to conspire together to do
an act injurious to trade or conmmerce.
The interpretation placed on the agreement was that
since it alia away with competition it created s-tch a com-
bination as to constitute an act injurious to trade or
cot::nerce, and hence within the provisions of the Revised
Statutes. The result was to fix 7,ric)s arbitrarily.
The people were deeply interested in having transporta-
tion rates subject to competition, and hence any coinbina-
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tion doing away with such competition must be injurious
ani illegal. 2o, ,2ince the contract was illegal, its
enforcement or any relief asked under it would be re-
fused.
The case of Staunton v. Allen--5 Lenio, 454-- de-
cided in 1848, dicussed a similar combination with the
sa'ie result. This combination was greater in extent
and more carefully planned, but the principal details
were much the same as in hooker v. Vandewater, and the
court followed that decision.
In these cases the court applied a statute in pass-
inp upon the question involved. In M.1orris Run Coal
Co. v. Barckley Coal Co.--68 Pa. St. 173-- decided in
1371, the court came to the same comclusion basing its
decision on corrnon law principles.
In this case five coal companies, incorporated under
the laws of Pennsylvania, agreed to combine and place
their business under one managment and divide the prof-
its in certain proportions. A comnittee was appointed
to manage the business, which committee had power to fix
prices and the proportions which each company should
furnish to the stock of coal, to be sold, and sh-uld
control the sale thereof. While each company might
soll coal itself, it could only dou so at the paV-e fixed
by the committee and could not sell beyond the proportion
assigned to it. The companies bound themselves not to
ship or sell any coal except according to the provis-
ions of the agreement. These companies practically
controlled the output of this particular kind of coal
which was extensively used and a necessary article ir
manufacturing. The coal companies claimed that the pur-
pose of the combination was to reduce expenses &c. in
producing and selling coal.
The court declared, that the reason of the combina-
tion was immaterial since the important fact remained
that the combination controlled the output, and madw the
coal bring greater prices than it would if the business
had bee left free and open to competition. That it
concerned an article of prime necessity. That its oper-
ation was general in a large region and affected all
wh. used coal. Any one of these companies might by it-
slef have taken any step tending to increase the price
of its own Eoods, yet all combined could not be permitted
to take similar steps. There is a potency in numbers
when combined which the law cannot overlook, when injury
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is the consequence of the combination; and such a com-
bination, being wide in its scope and general in its
effect, could only result in injury. Hence it mutst
be coisidered cont:.ary to public policy and void.
The courts said: "A contract is criminal whe , it
has a tendency to prejudice the public, ,or to oppress
individuals, by unjustly subjecting them to the power of
the confederates, and giving effect to the purpose,
whether it is extortion or otherwise." So on the ground
of public polict ,his combination was declar.d illegal.
Still another case is Craft v. 11c Conoughy--79 Ill.,
346-- decided in 1875. In this case there was an agree-
ment amopg five grain dealers in a town ; which while in
the forn of something in the nature of a partnership,
was really a co, bination to stifle competition and en-
able the parties, by secret means, to control the price
of grain, cost of storage, and expense of shipment at
this town. This was a written agreement signed by the
parties, dividing the business into certain proportions
and leaving the control of each man's business in his
own hands, but providing for reports of business done
to a general bookkeeper, and division of the profits in
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proportion to the share of the various parties. The pri-
ces to be charged were regulated by the combination.
One of the parties to this apre rint died soon after it
was made anu his son, who succeeded to his business, re-
f.used to recognize it. Suit was brought to compel the
payment of cert'-in money, belonging. to the combination,
said to have been held by his father; but the court re-
fused to grant relief. The grounds of the decision be-
ing tiiat tne contract was for the purpose of stifling
competition, and hence illegal.
in Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co.--68 P. Y.,
558-- aecided in 1877, the question arose out of an
agreement between two coal companies, the Pittston &
Elmira Coal Co. and the Butler Coal Co., by 4hich the
latter agreed not to ship any coal to Pew York State
except such as it sold to the former company, and by the
terr's of the c,.ntract could only ship 2,000 tons into
this territory in any event. The Lutler Company might
sell its coal anywhere except in Pew York as it chose,
and was not obliged to ship any into that stafte, but such
as it aid ship into that state must be subject to the
terms above mentioned.
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This company produced coal larrely in excess of
2: ,000 tons per month. The purpose of the 'lmira Compan,
in this case was to keep out cf the New York 'arket all
of the coal of the Butler Company's mines except such
as it coul. control. Similar agreements had been- made
by the Elmira Company with other coal companies.
The court said:, "That such a combination was in-
imical t(. the interests of the public ana that all con-
tracts designed to effect such an end are contrary to
public policy and therefore void. Every individual deal-
er has the right to use all legitimate efforts to obtain
the best price for his wares. lut .e has no right to en-
deavor to artificially enhance prices by suppressiing
or keeping out Of the market the products of others;
and any endeavor which he may make to bring about such
a state of things is contrary to public policy. If
such agreements or contracts were sustained there would
nothing to prevent the price of articles of necessity
from being raised unnaturally and slla at a ruinous
rate. In this case, if the Butler Company h-ad sold a
certain amount of its coal at a certain rate, or had
sold its whole product, the contract would have been
18
good, :ince the 1-utl,,,r Comi-,pany had a ripht to sell its
goods to the best auvantage even if the vendee intended
to make an imporoper use of the goods and the vendor
Inew it. lut if the vendor did anything to help along
the improper purpose he will be held to be particeps
criminis and cannot recover the price. This was the
present case. The Butler Company made no certain and
definite sale, but simply agreed to keer its coal out of
the Elmira Company's market, or if any came in it was to
be subject to the control of the Elmira Company. Thus,
knowing the illegal nature of the contract and assisting
in its execution, it was a party to it and for coal sold
under it neither the company nor their assignees could
recover.
In 1880 the case of Salt Co. v. Guthrie--35 Ohio
St., 666-- was.decided. Here a voluntary association
of salt manufacturers was formed for the purpose of
selling ana tvansporting that. cornumocity. By the arti-
cles of association all salt manufactured or owned by
the 1:.embers, when packed in barrels, becamne the property
of the company; and its committee was authorized to reg-
ulate the price and grade the ,.eof, and also to control
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the manne' and time of receiving salt from the member's.
Each member was prohibited from selling any salt during
the continuance of the association except by retail at
the factory -nd at prices fix'rc by the company.
In the decision the court said: ",Public policy
unquestionably favors competition in trade to the end
that its commodities may be afforded to the consumer as
cheaply as possible, and is opposed to monopolies which
tend to advance market prices to the injury of the gen-
eral public." It also pronounced the clear tendency
of such an agreement as this to be to establish a monop-
oly and destrot competition in trade, and for that reas-
on on F:rounds of public policy the court refused to en-
force the agreenent.
These cases show the dangers which assailed these
combinations, and resulted in their destruction. They
received no mercy at the hands of the courts. No matter
how ingenious were the arguments offered in their behalf,
the instant the fact that their tendency was to restrict
the production or enhance the price of any article ap-
peared, the courtwithout stopping to listen any further
pronounced them illegral and refused to have anything to
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do with the af'reev.nts which bound the uifferent parties
composinf- then.
Deprivea of enforcernent by the courts, these agree-
ments became so much waste paper, and any .-erber was
f'ree at any time to withdraw, and mri.ght at the same time
take aleng with him as much of the funds belonging to the
association as miaht have come into his poss-ission, and
be none the worse off. Or if there was no dispostion
on the part of any member to take such summary steps,and
even if all were content to remain loyal to the agree-
ment, ueathror any of the ordinary changes which occur
in business,would almost cer-tainly cause some break in
the ranks. So the greater the extent of the agreernent
and the greater the number included in the combination
the more opportunities were offered for dissension, and
the less the chance of permanent and successful combina-
tion. Since any iiember who withdrew and continued in
the same business at the old rates would be successful
beyond measure unless the others followed his example,
the result was that the whole combination depended upon
the action of any one member; so if one deserted the
rest must follow and the whole thing tumbled like a
house of cards.
On account of these many drawbacks, schemes of this
sort ceasod to flourish for a timu]e. But the causes
which led to them continued to edist and to increase,
and, as a result, the principle of combination was once
more resorted to. This seemed necessary as competition
grew sharper and sharper, and the profits gre'I corres-
pondingly less. But the fate of those agreements
which had already been made and broken made it apparent
that some more substantial form of union must be created
if the result was to be any more satisfactory. Then
the modern trust came into existence.
This word trust in its popular signification is
vastly more comprehensive than in its legal sense.
Cook in his work on Corporations describes it, in its
legal sense, as meaning an agreement between many stock-
holders in many corporation to place all their stock in
the hands of trustees, and to receive certificates there-
for from these trustees. "The stockholers thereby con-
solodate their interests, and bl:come trust certificate
holders. The trustees own the stoc4, vote it, elect
officers of the various corporations, control the busi-
ness, receive all the dividends on the stock, and use
1l1 these dividenus to pay dividends on the trust cer-
tificates. The truste )s are periodically elected by
the trust certificate holders."
The popular signification includes any combination
of the prouucers or dealers in any commodity. No matter
what the form of agreement which binds the members to-
gether, no matter what the purpose or result, the mere
mention of the fact that such a combination existst at
once entitles that combination to name of Trust, as well
as all the honors and abuse which that name in its pop-
ular, sense carries with it.
While, as we have seen, the idea of combination is
an old one; the popular agitation against these combi-
nations and their denunciation are recent. The reason
of this Lei ng, no doubt, the great extent, power, and
wealth, which a few have attained. The purpose of
their existence, as announced by their enemies, is to in-
crease the price of the articles contolled, and thus ex-
tort unroasonably large profits from the purchaser.
When this purpose is persistently called to the atten-
tion of the public by those who for somue cause or other
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announce themselves as enemies of the trust and friends
of the people, and the announcement of this purpose is
actually accompanied by an increase in the price of the
particular article, it is natural that they should be-
come decidedly unpopular.
This unpopularity having become apparent, it speed-
ily found expression in the press and the utterances
of political parties. Newspapers, anxious to make
r-ood their 6laims as champions of popular, liberty and
the peoples rights, have bristled with editorials fierce-
ly denouncing any and all such combinations; and having
denounced all those whose existence was known, so zeal-
ous were they that they could not stop there, but must needs
uiscover the existence of many mythical trusts, and
against these imaginary enemies do battle manfully for
the peoples rights. The two great political parties has-
tened to put the, ,selves on record, and rivaled each
other in their pledges and promises. A bitious politi-
cians and alleged statesmen have made trusts the t'?xt
for niany an eloquent address, and have shown that their
existence aas occasioned by the existence of a tariff,
and, with equally convincing logic, that a country en-
joying the blessing of free tirade was their paradise
Eills have been introduced into various lefislative bo-
aies with the intention of makii te xistence of so called
trusts irmpossible, and ,ihich had they become laws would
no doubt have succeeded in this object, ana probably
woula have rendered the existence of nearly every other
combination or partnei'ship illegal also.
The general consensus of opinion seemed to be that
the trust must go. Every one seemed to think except
ihe trust themselves. Notwithstanding their u popular-
ity they seemed inclined to reI main; andI not only to re-
vain, but to increase in numbers and wealth. Thev bore
up serenely under the dcnunciation of the press. They
di,- not appear to care what political parties said about
them. And, as for the bills w-ahich when enacted were
to destroy them,,they seemed to have little vitality,
and never made any substantial progress toward the stat-
ute book. At last more practical steps were taken to
bring about their destruction. The courts were invoked,
and the latest struggle between public policy and pri-
vate selfic-hness was instituted.
The combinations which were now to be assailed were
those which were either in the fori of trusts-- using
that word in its leghal sonse-- o,- else those which
so~ight to carry out their projects un er the form of cor-
rations. An exornple of a trust was The Suger F efiner-
ies Company, or, as it was popularly called, the Sugar
Trust. The illeFality of this trust has been declared
in the lower courts of this state, and is now awaitinr
final decision in the Court of Appeals. Both the opin-
ion of Judge Barrett at the Circuit, and of Judge Dan-
iels at the General Term, ar. to be found in 54 l1un, 354.
The plan of this trust is described in these opin-
ions. It appears that in fonniing it the first step
taken was to incorporate such of the concerns which were
to become members and which had before done business as
partnerships or as individuals. This was done in order
to enable the proposed trust board to more easilr con-
trol all of the concerns. The provisions creating this
trust board, and all the other provisions necessary to
the existence of the enterprise, were described in what
was called the "trust deed. ' Phis doc..,rent set forth
the various purposes for which the combination was said
to be forned. These were to promnote economy and reduce
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cost , to afford protection against unlawful combinations
of labor, to keep up the qualitv of refined sugar, and
generally to promote the interests of the mebers. All
the stock of all the corporations was transferred
to a board of eleven tiustees. To represent this stock,
these trustees issueu to the original stockholders what
were called trust certificates. When the stockholders
received these certificates their connection with their
own corporation ceased. Thenceforth the control of all
these corporations was in this board of trustees by
virtue of the fact that they held 2ll of the stock of
each of the corporations. Thus their power in each case
was as gneat as that which would have been exercised by
the original stockholders. Only so much of this stock
was parted with by the trustees as was sufficient to
render enoughi men elegible to fill the boards of direct-
ors of the various corporations. These boards, being
named by the trustees and under their control, would nat-
urally be subservient to their wishes. The trustdeed
provided that the profits made by the various concerns
should be paid over to the trustees, and by them divided
among the trust certificate holders.
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The situation under this deed is thus described by
Judg;e Larrett: "Thus we have a series of corpor-Itions
existing and transactin, business under the forms of law
without real membership or [enuinely qualified directors,-
--mere abstract figments of statutory creations,-- with-
out life in the contrete or underlying association.
Every share of stock has been practically surrendered
and vital membership resigned. "
The State brought an action to vacate the charter
of The north River Sugar Refining Co., one of these
corporations; and in this action the decision of both
the trial Court and. the Ceneral Term was to the effect
that the stockholders of this company had relinquished
that control'over its management which the law contem-
plated, and had turned over to the trust board. That
the corporation in this case could not set up that it
was a separate individual, and that the acts of the stock-
holders were not its acts, and hence it coulL not be pun-
ished or held repponsible for such acts, since the corpo-
ration was composed of these stockholders and the act
of the entire bcdy of stockholders would be the acV of
the corporation. That by this act the corporation ceased
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to exercise the functions prescribed b, law, and placed
itself under the control of a power which the law never
intenued should. control it. This was held a sufficient
offence arainst the provisions of the acts under which
the corporation was created to warrant its dissolution.
in addition to this it was hell that the purposes
for which this as§.gnment of powers was made was one
which was unlawful. Although certain purposes were men-
tioned in the trust deed and these were innocent in them-
selves, the court could look further for other purposes
which might exist. From the facts of this case the
court inferred that another purpose existed, which was to
control the product of sugar to an extent injurious to
the public. The trust deed contained so many provis-
ions for the absolute control of the various factories
by the trust board that it was reasonable to suppose that
they were to be used, and they could hardly be used with
any other result than the suppression of cmpetition;
"and where that appears to be the fact the association
or whatever else it may called, having for its object
the remoVal of competition aria the advancement of prices
of necessaries of life, is subject to the condemnation
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of the law by which it is denounced as a criminal enter-
pi'ise. "
After citingf cases the Judge also said that "the
association was created for an unlawful object, anc the
aefendant by making itself a party to the association
had renounced and abandoned its own duties, and placed
it interests and affairs under the direction and control
of a board which legally should have no power over it,
anu made itself liable to the judgment (of dissolution)
which had been renderea in this action."
Thus, this most carefully prepared scheme for the
purpose of restraining competitien was destroyed by the
assertion of the siL.leproposition that public policy
required freedoin of covpetition; and that corporations,
being the creatures of law, and restricte, by law to cer-
tain rights the exercise of which must be according to
la,', and by those to whom the privilege was granted/ coAld
not turn over the exercise of those rights to others for
purposes opposed to public policy.
Another attempt to avoid competition was the Chica-
g o Cas Trust Company. This was declared illegal by
the Supreme Court of Illinois. (22 N. E. 798)
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This company was organized under the general in-
corporation law of Illinois. The purposes for which it
vias incorporated were set forth in the statement,filed
with the Secretar-y of State, as follows; to make and
sell gas and electricity for lighting purposes, and to
buy and hold ov sell the capital stock of a ,y gas com-
pany in Chicago or elsewhere in Illinois. This compa-
ny after its incorporation purchased a majority inter-
est in four gas companies uoing business in Chicago, and
mana.reu them so that the, ceased to compete and acted
as a unit in charging higher prices for gas to all con-
sumers. The Gas Trust'Company's right to do this was
questioned. It was claimed that the their charter gave
them this tright.
The court d cided, that since the only mention of
these powers was in the statement filed with the Secre-
tary of ?tate, they could not be said to have been ob-
tained by the necessary legislative authority. The
filing of the certificates was only a step in the pro-
cess of incorpor-ation provided b- the general law, and
that the charter of the corporation was the general law
and the various state-.'uents and agreements taken together,
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and that the provisions uf the general law would control.
This company, if it were fonJ ' cd for the pui'poses of i- ak-
inpg gas, would by the terms of the law possess all nec-
essary powers for t at purpose. But the buVinp of
stock in other companies .was not such a necessry power,
and would not be acquire,_ under a charter empowering the
company to make gas. The company cle imed that it was
created for two purposes, making gas, an. buying stock
in ot-hcr companies. The court expressed soine doubt as
to whether a corporation could be created for two dis-
tinct objects; but, without passing upon that point,
proceeded to examine into the legality of the second
object. The court observed, that unaer this power
the company had obtained control of all the gas companies
in Chicago, and could manage them as it sa.- fit by means
of boards of directors of its own chosing. The result
of this was to destroy competition and build up a mo-
nopoly. The only powers that the company could obtain
unaer the general incorporation law were legal powers.
The business of supplying gas was of a public nature,
and companies engaged in this business owe a duty to
the public, and any nreasonable restraints upon the per-
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formance of such is contrary to public policy. Any act
to prevent competition and create a monopoly is contra-
ry to public policy . Unlawful acts of a corporation
are saia to be, not only those malum in se and malum
prohibitum, but also those which have no right to per-
form lawfully, that is those which are ultra vires.
If contracts and grants which tended to promote monopoly
were void at cormimon law then authority for similar acts
could nt be obtained by a corporation under a general
incorporation act.
Further it is said that the public policy of a state
is shown by 'he provisions of its Constitution, and the
Constitution of Illinois in 1870 declared against any
legislation giving exclusive privileges to any person
or corporation. After the adoption of this Constitu-
tion the public policy of the State was against the grant-
ing of any, exclusive privilege. The incorporation law
was -passed subject to this provision and governed bY it.
It could not be expected then, that a chat-ter would be
granted which would permit the controlling by one cor-
poration of all gas companies which migt be formed, or
as many as the corporation chose to control. Hence the
purpose of the corporation could not be lawful, and no
rights permitting the carrying on of this unlawful pur-
pose could be obtained under the incorporation act.
These companies, being ,f a quasi public nature,
ha. a duty to perfori towaids the public and the city.
If this corporation by its control prevented the per-
formance of such duties that also :las an unlawful act.
For these reasons the court declared that the sec-
ond purpose mentioned in the statement was one that was
contrary to the public policy of the State of lllinois,
and suc! being the case, was a power that could not be
obtained or exercised under the incorporation laws.
Hence the acts of the corporation Were without the pro-
tection 0 law and lacked an-, corporate authority.
1y this decision it appears that the purposes for
which a corporation is create., must be in accordance
with public policr; rnd that the fact that the steps
prescribed by law for incorporation had been properly
taken, and a corporate franchise secured, does not pre-
vent the purpose for which the corporation was created
from beinf inluired into. And if the purposes are found
contrary to public policy then theey will be held to be
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powers which the corporation could never huve possessed,
a!,d acts done in accordance termith will be declared
illegal.
In the case of Pichardson vs. Buhl, decided in the
Sup-eme Court of 1,lichipan, (43 N. W. 1102) a corpora-
tion intended to control the product of matches ,Vas de-
clared to be one created for an illegal purpose, and
contracts made to furthei- its forilation -Jere illegal and
their enforcement was refused by the court. The court
said that the purpose of the company was boldly avowed
to be tu control the manufacture of an article of uni-
versal use and necessity. This agreement in question
was to farther that purpose. Such purpose being contra-
ry to public policy an. hostile to the interests of the
peoplp,oughjt to receive the condemnation of the courts.
it was an unlawful purrose, and being so this agreement
made to further that purpose was illegal and void, and
hence relief was denied the plaintiff.
The cases which have been mentioned were all de-
cided by declaring that any agreement which tended to
do away with competition was against public policy.
So long' as the purpose 'as to dispose of only one rival
the contract was held good, even though it was made
avowedly for the pui-pose of removing a competitor.
in the two cases of Diamond Match Company vx. Roeber and
Leslie vs. Lorrillard, this was the case, and the court
in passing upon them used languago which seemed to im-
ply that competition was not to be considered at all
times necessary.
'hen the question arises in passing upon the status
of a combination of several parties the view takken seems
to be different. The mere fact that the combination is
for the purpose of suppressing competition is of itself
sufficient to condemn. That purpose is at once pro-
nounced illegal without argument or discussion. Its il-
legality is taken as an indisputed fact. If this purpose
is discovered to have tcaused the creation of any trust
or combination, or if, while more innocent purposes-are
set forth, the court believes that this was the real pur-
pose, then the trust or combination is at once pronounced
illegal. it matters not how carefully the plah is
made, nor how elaborately the details are worked out,
this one fact condemns it; and, without listening to any
argument however profound or technical, the combination
is declared illegal. in case after case it is said,
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that so long as competition is f£'ee the interests of the
ublic are safe, and until this lim,,it is passed the
parties may do anything the, chose, and take any steps
the., wish, to improve their position. But to pass this
limit is to pass outside the pale of legal protection,
and brave the power of the courts backed by popular hos-
tility; and in the conflict that then arises there has
been and can be but one result.
This one principle,that monopolies anu combinations
tending to prouuce monopolies are illegal, is the ground
work of all the laws that have been proposed or enacted
for the suppression of trusts. These laws simply re-
peat that principle in various forms, extend its appli-
cation perhaps, and fix penalties for its violation.
This one rule is the weapon with which trusts are struck
down. Courts ana legislatures are pledged to use it,
and they will continue in its use so long as s-ch seems
to be the demand of popular senti. ent.
Whether trusts or combinations of this nature will
ever becane recofnized as legal institutions depends up-
on this popular sentiment. If it can be shown that the
objections urged agpainst trusts do not necessarily re-
suit; if the prejudice of centuries a ,ainst monopoly
can be shown to be groundless unuer modern conaitions;
then trusts and combinations restraining competition may
lose their present unsavory reputation, and boccme recog-
nized as legal institutions. Lut if this end is ever
attained it must be through a change of public opinion.
Until that occurs the courts and legislatures will be
,heir most resolute opponents.

